Updated February 22, 2005

Updated February 22, 2005 free pdf ebook was written by February 22, 2005 on February 22, 2005 consist of 30 page(s). The pdf file is provided by www.fas.org and available on pdfpedia since May 08, 2012.

order code rl32508 crs report for congress received through the crs web intelligence,..a major portion of u.s. intelligence spending that, according to media..they are acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases...

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Updated February 22, 2005 pdf

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: February 22, 2005
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Updated February 22, 2005 - page 1
Order Code RL32508 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress Updated February 22, 2005 Richard A. Best, Jr. Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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Updated February 22, 2005 - page 2
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress Summary Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions are principal elements of U.S. defense capabilities, and include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing information needed by national security decisionmakers and military commanders. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are “national” systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to Washington-area agencies; others are “tactical” systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S. intelligence spending that, according to media estimates, amounts to some $40 billion annually. For some time Congress has expressed concern about the costs and management of ISR programs. With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition has been coordinated by the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community. Although there are long- existing staff mechanisms for reviewing and coordinating ISR programs in the context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congress believe that existing procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps in coverage. Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of information and serve similar customers, but they are acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have been beset by increasing costs and schedule delays. Recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require that the Defense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and integration of ISR capabilities over the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if developed, could potentially ensure more comprehensive coverage of targets and save considerable sums of money. To establish responsibility for an Intelligence Community-wide effort, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new position of Director of National Intelligence be established to manage the national intelligence program (but not joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which would continue to be managed by the Defense Department). This position was included, after extended debate, in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) that was approved by the President on December 17, 2004. The implications of this legislation for ISR programs are as yet uncertain, but Congress may seek to assess the effectiveness of the statute in addressing long-existing concerns with ISR programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
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Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Congressional Concerns with ISR: Lack of Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Supplemental Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Reprogramming Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Momentum for Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Multiple Types of ISR Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 NIP Programs Serve National Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 JMIP Programs Serve the Defense Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 TIARA Programs Serve the Military Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 ISR Programming and Budgeting Procedures Differ Among Agencies . . . . . . . 15 Role of the DCI/DNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Role of the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Changes in DOD’s Management of ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 How ISR Funding is Included in DOD’s Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Internal DOD Coordinating Boards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Coordination Between DOD and the IC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Congressional Oversight of ISR Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Appendix A: A Case Study in ISR Acquisition: The Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Global Hawk UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Programs (ISR): Issues for Congress Introduction The various systems that collect, process, and disseminate intelligence are encompassed in the budget category known as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR 1 ). ISR covers a multitude of programs ranging from billion- dollar satellites to hand-held cameras. The bulk of funding is for research and development (R&D) and procurement; personnel costs are comparatively low. Some systems are used only by military units; others are national systems operated by Washington-level defense agencies. Most are surrounded in secrecy, but total spending on ISR, while difficult to estimate with unclassified information, undoubtedly runs into the tens of billions of dollars. The ISR programs considered in this report are managed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and by the large intelligence agencies and components of the Department of Defense (DOD). 2 ISR acquisition has in recent years come under strong criticism. Reportedly, there are technical problems with the new generation of reconnaissance satellites, along with billion dollar cost-overruns; only a small number of the planned high- altitude UAVs are actually deployed; and there have been difficulties in ensuring that the troops who need intelligence acquire it in a timely manner. There is a widespread awareness that ISR spending, much greater than in past years, could easily absorb even larger portions of defense and intelligence budgets, making the need for tradeoffs even more important. Some observers point to the possibility that satellites and UAVs potentially undertake the same or similar missions, but that the current system gives little opportunity for cost comparisons or trade-offs to be made in the 1 ISR as used in Defense Department documents refers to the sets of collection and processing systems, and associated operations, involved in acquiring and analyzing information about foreign countries. Intelligence is a more general term; surveillance refers to systematic observation of a targeted area or group, usually over an extended time; reconnaissance refers to an effort or a mission to acquire information about a target and can mean a one-time endeavor. See U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001. As used in this Report, the term “intelligence systems” encompasses all ISR systems. The intelligence programs of the State, Justice (including the FBI), Energy, and Treasury Departments have far fewer budgetary implications and will not be addressed herein. Many of the activities of the Coast Guard, now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have important intelligence implications, but only some are budgeted as intelligence programs. 2
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CRS-2 acquisition process. Appendix A provides a case study of the trade-offs between satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Understanding the procedures for acquiring ISR systems is, however, complicated by the fact that different ISR systems are acquired in entirely different ways, by different intelligence agencies or military services, and are designed for different users. In addition, the acquisition processes are overseen by different congressional committees. It is difficult to ensure efficient acquisition in the separate programs which are often based on innovative technologies. It is even more challenging to envision a seamless and comprehensive system of systems and to ensure the acquisition of an optimal mix of specific systems. Congressional Concerns with ISR: Lack of Coordination Although procedures for coordinating the budgeting of ISR programs have long been in place, some Members of Congress have concluded that the procedures have not been wholly effective. There has been, it is argued, inadequate data to compare systems capabilities and costs across the spectrum of intelligence programs, an imbalance between collection and analysis programs, and an intelligence effort that does not reflect an optimal allocation of extensive resources. Expressions of congressional concern go back a number of years. In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) expressed its misgivings about existing cooperation among agencies and recommended a joint review by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that “both Intelligence Community and Defense Department equities are served in the planning, programming, and management of all intelligence activities and programs.” 3 Some believed that giving the DCI greater management responsibilities would improve the management of ISR programs, including those in the Department of Defense (DOD). Reflecting that view, the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104-293) included provisions that strengthened the ability of the DCI “to manage the Intelligence Community by codifying his authority to participate in the development of the budgets for defense-wide and tactical intelligence....” 4 The Conference Committee stated: “Giving the DCI a database of all intelligence activities and requiring all National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) elements 5 U.S. Congress, 104 th Congress, 1 st session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996 for the Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 104-97, June 14, 1995, p. 4. U.S. Congress, 104 th Congress, 2d session, Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H.Rept. 104-832, September 24, 1996, p. 38. 5 4 3 There are three types of intelligence programs; NFIP (renamed the National Intelligence Program (NIP) by the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act) includes the national programs that support senior policymakers; the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) that provides (continued...)
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CRS-3 to submit periodic budget execution reports should enable the DCI to make better use of his existing authorities — given to him by Congress in 1992 — to approve the budgets of NFIP elements and to transfer funds and personnel with the concurrence of affected agency heads. The conferees in considering the FY1997 legislation urged the DCI to be more assertive in using these authorities.” 6 In May 2000, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that, “the budget practices of the [Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)] and the Intelligence Community as a whole are simply inadequate to address current requirements. Upper level program managers lack sufficient insight into the process to make informed and timely decisions regarding the allocation of funds, and to assure Congress, and themselves, that funds are being spent as appropriated and authorized.” 7 The next year the committee again argued that the Intelligence Community “is handicapped by the lack of comprehensive strategic and performance plans that can be used to articulate program goals, measure program performance, improve program efficiency and aid in resource planning.” Accordingly, the Committee directed the DCI to produce a “comprehensive Intelligence Community strategic plan and performance plan, as well as complementary strategic and performance plans for the intelligence agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program aggregation.” The Committee asked that such plans be undertaken annually and made available to congressional committees by March 1 of each year. 8 In 2002 the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledged receipt of the “first- ever plans coordinated across the Intelligence Community aimed at establishing performance measures aligned with the stated goals and priorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.” The Committee went on, however, to indicate that further work is needed and suggested that developing new systems merely to acquire a new capability was insufficient; the capability had to meet validated intelligence needs. “A key issue is the development of performance plans and measures that are not focused solely on the attainment of intelligence capabilities but also on the value received from such capabilities in pursuit of Intelligence Community missions.” 9 Despite this admonition, the next year the Committee called attention to the absence of a 2003 performance plan submission, even though the deadline had passed 5 (...continued) support to officials throughout DOD; and Tactical Intelligence and Related Programs (TIARA) that are designed to support a single military service. For further background, see below, pp. 11-14. Ibid., p. 39. S.Rept. 106-279, p. 33. S.Rept. 107-63, p. 17. 6 7 8 9 U.S. Congress, 107 th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 107-149, May 9, 2002, p. 28.
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CRS-4 with no request for an extension. 10 More significantly, the Committee noted that it is aware of no capability within DoD or the Intelligence Community for objectively, independently, and comprehensively evaluating alternative sensor and platform architecture and capabilities. There are some capabilities within different agencies and departments, but none that are available, independent of the program offices, to model and assess cross-program trades without regard to the location of the sensor or platform (air, space, land, or sea) or the level of compartmentation. Consequently, although DoD and Intelligence Community officials expend substantial effort and time evaluating program trades, they do so without the benefit of the rigorous quantitative modeling necessary to optimize collection capabilities and architectures. Given the vast sums involved in these programs, even modest increases in the efficiency of resources allocation could lead to substantial benefits. Further, the Committee notes that the national military strategy, as well as the Defense Planning Guidance, have been developed in recent years without the participation of the Director of Central Intelligence or his staff, notwithstanding the growing importance of intelligence to military operations and the need to build forces commensurate to validated threats. 11 Section 355 of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177) required a report from the DCI and the Secretary of Defense assessing progress in the development of “a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities for the collection of intelligence ... [and] the improvement of coordination between the Department [of Defense] and the intelligence community on strategic and budgetary planning. U.S. Congress, 108 th Congress, 1 st session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 108-44, May 8, 2003, pp. 12-13. Ibid, p. 13. Furthermore, the Committee complained that the National Security Agency (NSA), a major intelligence agency, had been unable to provide basic information about its acquisition efforts: It is very difficult for the Committee to understand what needs to be done to modernize NSA when NSA cannot provide an adequate baseline of ongoing development and acquisition programs, projects, and activities.... The Committee has fenced funds over the past two fiscal years to try to bring command attention to this problem. Submissions to date have shown progress, but are not comprehensive in identifying known projects and programs that are being funded in the CCP.... Future funding requests will be balanced against the NSA acquisition baseline so it is in the agency’s best interest to get this done right, and soon. Ibid., p. 17. 11 10
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CRS-5 In separate legislation, Congress also urged that DOD take a greater role in managing ISR; in section 923 of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108- 136) Congress found that: ... there is not currently a well-defined forum through which the integrators of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for each of the Armed Forces can routinely interact with each other and with senior representatives of Department of Defense intelligence agencies, as well as with other members of the intelligence community, to ensure unity of effort and to preclude unnecessary duplication of effort. 12 P.L. 108-136 further stated that the existing structure of intelligence programming may not be the best approach for supporting the development of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance structure that is integrated to meet the national security requirements of the United States in the 21 st century. Accordingly, the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to establish an “ISR Integration Council” to provide a permanent forum for assessing ISR capabilities. The council is to consist of senior intelligence officers of the services, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and the directors of DOD intelligence agencies. The DCI would be “invited” to participate. The council would be charged with developing a comprehensive roadmap “to guide the development and integration” of DOD ISR capabilities for 15 years. 13 In addition to its general concerns about ISR programs, some Members of Congress have specifically focused on two issues related to budget processes that they argued undermine their abilities to conduct oversight of ISR efforts. They argue that congressional budget justification books have been inadequate, and that there has been an over-reliance on supplemental appropriations to fund continuing ISR programs. Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) Effective congressional oversight depends on accurate, consistent information over a multi-year period; the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence The accompanying committee report noted that the U.S. has “ the most capable ISR system in the world” but “as good as this system is, however, it is often plagued by gaps, competition for assets, unavailability at the required level, and parallel systems (so-called ‘stovepipes’) that do not fully complement one another.... the Department has continued to develop some capabilities without regard to their place within an overarching ISR architecture.” U.S. Congress, 108 th Congress, 1 st session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, S.Rept. 108-46, May 13, 2003, p. 355. Section 923, P.L. 108-136; on April 7, 2004, the Senate Armed Services was informed that the Council had recently started meeting. Testimony of Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 2004. 13 12
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CRS-6 (HPSCI), in particular, has criticized the inadequacy of intelligence budget justification materials and asked for more complete budgetary submissions in the form of congressional budget justification books . Proposals for ISR programs are to be forwarded to intelligence committees along with armed services and appropriations committees. Justification materials on national programs are submitted to the two intelligence committees along with classified CBJBs, which include one volume for each NIP program plus an additional summary volume. The classified books, available to Members and committee staff, include explanatory narrative and resource displays for all resources requested by the program. Also included are descriptions of base levels of efforts, ongoing initiatives and new initiatives with associated resource displays. CBJBs are submitted to Congress within a few weeks of the delivery of the budget in early February and form the basis for the committees’ review of the entire NIP prior to the drafting of annual intelligence authorization bills. Once the intelligence committees complete their review — generally in the spring and early summer — the legislation is referred to the armed services committee which have the option of submitting a separate report prior to floor consideration. Classified budget justification books, provided by the Administration to Congress, are the primary ways, in addition to oral testimony, by which Congress obtains information about intelligence programs. In 1997 HPSCI criticized justification books for lacking “several critical components necessary for the Committee to ensure proper alignment of funding within the funding appropriations categories. Clear identification of each project; its specific budget request numbers; the appropriation category (e.g., Other Procurement, Defense-wide; RDT&E, Navy, etc.); the budget request line number, and if a research and development project, the Program Element number [are] essential to this task.... Therefore, the Committee directs the CMS [Community Management Staff] and the Defense Department to provide this specific data in all future budget justification documents.” 14 In 2000, HPSCI expressed its continued frustration with a perceived lack of detail provided in justification books (which are classified) and strongly criticized financial management practices at some NFIP agencies. HPSCI stated that: U.S. Congress, 105 th Congress, 1 st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, H.Rept. 105-135, Part 1, June 18, 1997, p. 64. The subsequent Conference Report noted that the CMS was then in the process of revising the structure of the CBJBs and deferred the provision pending the outcome of CMS efforts; see U.S. Congress, 105 th Congress, 1 st session, Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, H.Rept. 105-350, October 28, 1997, p. 30. In the same year, House Committee on National Security, also concerned that all costs of all aspects of programs were not being identified, directed that future CBJBs show “all direct and associated costs, in each budget category (e.g. procurement, research and development, operations and maintenance, military construction, etc.)....” U.S. Congress, 105 th Congress, 1 st session, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, H.Rept. 105-132, June 16, 1997, p. 304. A year later, HPSCI noted good progress by the IC in preparing submissions for FY1999, but asked for additional data. H.Rept. 105-508, p. 16. 14
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CRS-7 ... the NFIP agencies need greater insight into their financial obligations and the capabilities that they are developing. NSA’s baseline activity, for example, identified many areas of duplicative development, as well as lack of investment in key strategic areas. Yet, due to the lack of detail, the CBJB did not provide this information. The Committee notes that, at least at some agencies, internal financial management practices seriously complicate this process.... 15 In 2003, HPSCI again called attention to limitations in the data included in CBJBs which is often less extensive than that routinely provided in DOD budget materials: The Committee believes, for example, that acquisition program details in the CBJBs should include major milestones and deliverables for contracted projects for the entire length of a contract and contain more specificity for the budget year of the request. Many of the project milestones in the CBJBs are, however, at such a high-level that the Committee is unable to determine the stage of the development activity or what will be accomplished in the coming year. The project descriptions are often so vague that the Committee is unable to determine the value of, or even what is being developed. 16 Supplemental Appropriations While procedures for annual budget submissions have long been established, there has been an increasing practice in recent years, and especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks, of providing intelligence funding in supplemental appropriations acts. 17 Of the $165.6 billion in supplemental appropriations that the Defense Department has received since September 2001, a significant, but not publicly identified, portion of these sums — at least $16 billion (not counting funds received in the FY2004 Iraq supplemental) — was directed at intelligence and intelligence-related activities. 18 15 16 17 H.Rept. 106-620, p. 24. H.Rept. 108-163, p. 25. Section 504(a)(1) of the National Security Act requires that funds for intelligence activities be “specifically authorized by the Congress.” Intelligence authorization acts (including their classified annexes) provide specific authorization, although appropriations acts also usually have generalized language providing specific authorization to meet the 504(a)(1) requirement. (The inclusion of such provisions in appropriations acts serves as authorization until authorization bills are enacted or in the absence of authorization bills, as often occurs when supplemental appropriations bills are enacted.) Even when authorization legislation is under consideration the two appropriations committees also review intelligence budget submissions, and intelligence funds for most intelligence activities are included in annual defense appropriation bills. Supplemental appropriations that fund intelligence activities include an authorizing provision to comply with section 504 of the National Security Act, but they are not reported by the two intelligence committees. During floor consideration of the FY2004 intelligence authorization bill, Representative Hastings, a member of HPSCI, stated: “it is important to note that this bill authorizes only (continued...) 18
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